As in past years, the early preference polls focused on well-known names and past contenders. Throughout 1995, the only active candidates to average poll support of ten percent or higher were past contender and Senate Majority Leader Dole and prominent conservative Senator Phil Gramm. As in earlier years, most first-time candidates could not significantly raise their national poll standings.
The exception to this pattern was celebrity author and former general Colin Powell. When Powell's name was included in a September 22-24, 1995 Gallup Poll, he tied front-runner Dole at 31 percent.2 On November 8th, however, Powell announced he would not be a candidate for the Repub lican nomination.
These small fluctuations during the invisible primary are typical of past years. In 1987, for example, poll support for the three GOP front-runners in early polls (George Bush, Bob Dole, and Pat Robertson) varied only an average of eight percent from high to low. In the Democrat race, poll sup port for the three poll front-runners (Jesse Jackson, Michael Dukakis, and Paul Simon) varied only an average of four percent from high to low during 1987.
Typically, dramatic poll shifts do not occur until the early caucuses and primaries, when media attention is more focused on the election (Aldrich 1980; Marshall 1981) . For example, in 1988 , between late January and midMarch, poll support changed dramatically for the leading candidates. For George Bush, poll support jumped 24 percent over a six week period (from 45 to 69%)-an average poll increase of four percent a week among Repub licans nationwide. In 1992, support for Bill Clinton among Democrats nationwide jumped 25 percentage points (from 17 to 41 %) during a six week period in January and February-an average increase of four percent a week among Democrats nationwide.
These results suggest that the highly front-loaded 1996 primary and caucus-convention season will find public opinion still rapidly adjusting to the February and early March caucuses and primaries when the "Junior Tuesday" (M arch5), "SuperTuesday" (March 12), and "BigTen" (March 19) primaries are held. When early primary and caucus winners surge in the polls, their poll surge usually continues for a minimum of two weeks or more. In 1996, however, the primary season is so front-loaded that the time from the Iowa caucus to Super Tuesday is only one month.
The 1995 candidate field seemed to inspire unusually little public enthu siasm. Several polls reported widespread willingness to vote for a third-party candidate. In July 1996, for example, a Gallup Poll reported that only 41 percent of Americans polled would be satisfied with a Clinton-versus-Dole contest, while 56 percent would want to see an independent candidate on the ballot. In mid-1995 ex-General and celebrity author Colin Powell ran nearly even with Clinton and Dole; a Gallup Poll reported 28 percent for Powell, 33 percent for Clinton, and 29 percent for Powell. Texas billionaire Ross Perot gathered 20 percent, versus 40 percent for Clinton, and 35 percent for Dole. Such results suggest an underlying volatility in support for both frontrunners.
Several other nationwide polls also showed widespread voter dissatis faction with the early frontrunners. In an October 27-30, 1995 Los Angeles Times Poll, 43 percent of voters said they would consider an alternative to the GOP and Democrat nominees. That figure was up from 29 percent in January 1995, or 28 percent in March 1992, who said they would consider an independent or third-party candidate.
A Gallup Poll question from January 5-7, 1996 showed similar results. Only a third (37%) of Americans indicated that they thought there was a presidential candidate from either party who would make a good president. A plurality (43%) said there was not. The percentage responding that there was no candidate who would make a good president was highest among Independents (49%), but also relatively high among both Republicans (42%) or Democrats (37%).
The Democrats
The lack of a significant challenger to Democrat incumbent Bill Clinton is somewhat surprising. Of the last four incumbents, two (Ford in 1976 , Carter in 1980 ) drew significant opposition, while two (Reagan in 1984, Bush in 1992) did not.3 Mid-term losses better predict whether an incumbent will have a significant challenge than do early public opinion standings. By this mid-term loss predictor, the Democrat Party's unusually large 1994 Congressional losses would suggest a significant Democrat challenge would have arisen to President Clinton's renomination. Aside from his relatively strong poll support among self-identified Democrats, how can President Clinton's lack of opposition best be ex plained? At least two more answers can be offered.
First, the large number of unpledged, official "super-delegates" in the Democrat Party helps explain the lack of opposition to Clinton's renomina tion. Super-delegates include all Democrat members of the U.S. House and Senate, national committee members, governors, the President and Vice President, former presidents and vice presidents, former House Speakers and Senate Majority Leaders, and former chairs or current members of the Democrat National Committee. These unpledged delegate votes account for 18 percent (or 773 of 4294) of the 1996 Democrat convention delegates. In addition, state party leaders and elected officials account for another 11 percent (or 461 of 4294) of delegate votes.4 Overall, only 3060 delegate votes are directly chosen through district or at-large delegate process-some 71 percent of the total Democrat delegate votes.
Because of the super-delegates, a majority of Democrat convention delegates will be picked (in primary states) or the process begun (in caucusconvention states) by March 9, 1996. By comparison, for the GOP nomina tions process, the date on which a majority of delegates have been selected (or the process begun) is almost two weeks later, on March 19th.
The super-delegates provide a significant buffer against challenges to an incumbent president. Super-delegates were approved by the Hunt Com mission prior to the 1984 Democrat nominations process. The aim was to provide a greater voice to recognized party leaders and to those who would have to work with the candidate, should he be elected president (Crotty 1983; Crotty and Jackson 1985) . In 1984 the super-delegates heavily backed former vice-president and party insider Walter Mondale. In 1988 such dele gates overwhelmingly preferred nominee Michael Dukakis over party rival Jesse Jackson. Overall, the track record of Democrat super-delegates probably benefits centrists and incumbents.
Second, the lack of a challenge to incumbent Democrat President Clin ton may have also resulted in part from the Democrats' heavy Congressional losses in 1994. Ironically, these unexpectedly large losses led to GOP con trol in both the U.S. House and Senate. In turn, potential Congressional challengers lost their committee chairmanships and staffs, their ability to control the legislative calendar, and much of their funding sources.
Whatever the explanation, President Clinton's lack of invisible primary opposition benefits his campaign considerably. By one calculation, Clinton's campaign will have almost $40 million in private contributions and federal matching funds to use before August 1996-when both Clinton and his GOP opponent will receive more federal funding for the general election (Broder 1996) .
Campaign Fund-raising
As in past years, the announced contenders showed a large range in fund-raising totals and sources of contributions. According to September 30, Gramm campaigns led in contributions.
According to one press report, front-runner Dole raised another $5.7 million during the last quarter of 1995. Gramm ($1.9 million), Buchanan ($2.3 million), Alexander ($1.5 million), and Lugar ($700,000) trailed in last-quarter fundraising (Marcus, 1996) .
The Federal Election Commission set a first-time record by failing to raise sufficient taxpayer funds to fully pay all the matching funds approved. The full matching fund amounts will be paid later in the spring, but only sixty percent of the dollars candidates qualified for will be paid immediately. Several candidates were expected to be forced to take out bank loans against the expected amounts, and to pay interest until the matching funds were finally paid.5
The September FEC figures in Table Four do not include cash-on-hand. According to campaign sources, Dole led GOP contenders in that category with $7 million at years end, with Gramm ($4.7 million) and Alexander ($1.2 million) as the next most solvent candidates. Large differences in the candidates' federally-approved matching funds also occurred, as Table Five , below, indicates. Candidates Dole, Clinton, and Dole had been certified to receive the largest amounts of federal matching funds, as of the December 27, 1995, FEC figures. These large amounts will further magnify the front-runners' ability to run a nationwide race, over their less well-funded challengers. Note: All figures are rounded off to the nearest thousands (000) of dollars. ■"Natural Law Party candidate.
Candidate Strategies
Republican candidates pursued markedly different strategies throughout 1995. All the major GOP followed the now-conventional strategies of organ izing early, raising large dollars, and building organizations in several states (Wayne 1996) . The candidates also focused their efforts on the early con tests, particularly the traditionally-critical Iowa caucuses and New Hamp shire primaries. By one estimate, the GOP candidates spent a record 379 days campaigning in Iowa alone (Berke 1996) . Altogether, the GOP candi dates spent an estimated $60 million before 1996, with heavy early organ izing, focus groups and polls, and television campaigns (Berke 1996) . Senator Dole, for example, campaigned extensively in both states, and won an early endorsement from New Hampshire GOP Governor Stephen Merrill.
Front-runner Bob Dole clearly led prenomination season GOP polls, and joined Senator Gramm as the fund-raiser frontrunner. Dole's early en dorsements from elected Republicans, his standing and media presence as Senate Majority Leader, and his past campaigns all helped his nomination bid. Dole also benefitted from a fragmented field of opponents, including the proliferation of conservative Republicans, such as Gramm, Buchanan, Doman, and Keyes. Prolonged media speculation over ex-General Powell's candidacy, and the late entry of media mogul Steve Forbes also diverted attention from Dole's opponents. By January 1996 Dole seemed to have the resources in depth needed to remain in the race, despite a possible early setback.6
Faced with weak early showings in Iowa and New Hampshire polls, Senator Gramm's campaign joined state party activists to encourage early events in states more likely to be favorable to him, such as the Arizona and Delaware primaries and Louisiana caucuses.7 Gramm's well-funded and strong grassroots organization also focused heavily on a series of non binding straw polls during 1995, with considerable success. Gramm's repeated first-or second-place finish in early GOP straw polls, however, did not significantly raise his nationwide poll figures. By January 1996, Gramm ran third in nationwide polls, trailing both Dole and newcomer Steve Forbes.
Notably, the invisible primary witnessed at least two prominent GOP candidates drop out even before the first primary-first, California Governor Pete Wilson (on September 29, 1995), and second, Pennsylvania GOP Sena tor Alan Specter (on November 22). Their unusually early exit reflected the high costs of organizing an increasingly front-loaded set of primaries and caucuses, and the difficulty of organizing within a fragmented field. Cali fornia Governor Wilson had a difficult reelection contest in 1994, delaying his presidential bid.8
Several other potential candidates did not enter the contest-including Bill Bennett, Richard Cheney, Jack Kemp, and former vice-president Dan Quayle. For most of the non-candidates, the demands of raising funds was cited in their decision not to run. The large number of GOP non-candidates and early dropouts clearly shows that the invisible primary is a critical stage of the presidential nominations process.
For the first time in recent years, the dynamics of the race appeared to favor Washington-based office-holders. Early GOP front-runners Bob Dole and Phil Gramm were both Senators-a group previously thought to be dis advantaged by the heavy time demands of the open nominations process.
Senate Majority Leader Dole benefitted from extensive media coverage during the 1995 Congress-White House conflicts, from his support among key GOP governors, and from his fund-raising ability as Senate Majority Leader. The GOP sweep in the 1994 Congressional election also provided a GOP Senate majority, thereby ensuring that Dole could better control the Senate schedule than had he been the Senate minority leader. His strong early showing calls into question the widespread thesis that the post-1968 "open" nominations process effectively excludes Washington insiders, in cumbent presidents aside (Marshall 1981) .
Senator Gramm benefitted from the so-called "LBJ Law"-a vestige of earlier presidential races which allowed a Texas Senator to run for re-election and for President at the same time. While the unique Texas law was often criticized, no serious effort was made in the 1995 Texas legis lature to change the law, which had earlier benefitted Senators Lyndon Johnson and Lloyd Bentsen. Gramm's frequent absences from the Senate and from Texas were sometimes blamed for his sliding home-state popular ity. According to the statewide Texas Poll, Gramm's approval ratings slid from 63 percent in Spring 1991 to 46 percent in Summer 1995.9 Nonethe less, no serious GOP challenger appeared for Gramm's U.S. Senate seat in the U.S. Senate primary.
Both early front-running Senators also benefitted from their extensive contacts. Dole had run three times previously in the GOP national race. Gramm had served as National Republican Senatorial Committee in the 1994 election.
Perhaps the most unusual challenger was millionaire heir and media mogul Malcolm S. "Steve" Forbes. The heir to a media fortune estimated by Fortune magazine to be some $439 million, Forbes could self-fund a latestarting (September 22, 1995) nomination bid. Forbes spent an estimated $7 million in media advertising in 1995, and $12 million total, according to media estimates. By turning down federal matching funds, Forbes will be able to spend unlimited funds in the 1996 nominations contest. Forbe's heavy-spending campaign pushed him to a second-place virtual tie in early polls in Iowa and New Hampshire,10 as well as a first-place finish in at least one statewide poll (Arizona).11 Like Ross Perot, Forbes demonstrated that well-funded outsiders can make a credible race despite a lack of prior party service or elective office. The rising prominence of self-funded multi millionaires may challenge reformers to rethink the complex federal fund raising and spending limits.
The remaining GOP candidates struggled to attract media attention, a nationwide organization, and stronger financial and poll standings. Of the remaining GOP candidates, former Tennessee Governor and U.S. Education Secretary Lamar Alexander and former contender Pat Buchanan appeared to have a strong early organization in several states. Both focused on early events, especially Iowa and New Hampshire as the traditional "outsider's" strategy, but also organized in several Southern and Midwestern states.
The Campaign Schedule
Perhaps the most dramatic change for the 1996 presidential nomination season is the moving forward of many states' delegate-selection events. Several states moved their dates forward to increase their influence over the nominations process and attract more candidate attention. The most notable changes include Louisiana Republicans, who scheduled a February 6th caucus, just 6 days before Iowa's traditional first caucus,12 and Delaware, which scheduled a primary only four days after New Hampshire's traditional first primary.13 Because both Iowa and New Hampshire state law specify that the state will retain the first scheduled date (Iowa), or precede any other primary by a week (New Hampshire), the changes caused a prolonged stand off. At this writing, the Louisiana GOP caucus and Delaware primaries were still scheduled.
Several other states also moved their primaries forward. The California primary, for example, had traditionally been held in early June. For 1996, however, the event was scheduled much earlier, on March 26th. Because so many other states or state parties also moved delegate-selection earlier, however, the California GOP primary will still occur relatively late-after 60 percent of GOP delegates are already selected.
The "front-loading" of delegate-selection events mean that a majority of GOP delegates will be chosen by the time of the March 19th Midwestern regional primary (Illinois, Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin). By another com parison, in 1996, one-half the GOP delegates will be selected by the 7th week of the delegate-selection process. In 1992, half the GOP delegates were not selected until the 11th week, and in 1988, not until the 13th week of the delegate-selection process (Berke 1966) .
The front-loading of delegate selection also means that early-raised money and field organizations become especially important, and that momentum may have a stronger impact on the 1996 GOP race than in pre vious years. A successful candidate must compete in 30 caucuses and pri maries within six weeks of the February 12th Iowa caucus-with much less time to raise more money or place together a field organization than in past years.
The importance of front-loading primaries and caucuses in 1996 will need to be re-examined after the nominations season. Clearly, early fund raising and a strong field organization become more important. Early pri mary and caucus successes, free media coverage, and media labeling of "winners" and "losers" may also take on considerable more importance. Whether the front-loaded nominations season will benefit a candidate with the resources to organize widely, versus the early primary and caucus winner is as yet unclear. Some even speculated that the increasingly frontloaded primaries and caucuses might encourage a national primary (Busch and Ceasar 1996) .
The front-loading of the primary season suggests that most candidates will almost certainly drop out of the race well before they become wellknown and that the perennially low levels of issue voting in past presidential nominations races will likely continue. The highly front-loaded primary season may preclude very much issue learning among voters, even for the eventual nominee (Zukin and Keeter 1980; Patterson 1980) . Several reasons contributed to the extensive front-loading of the 1996 nominations season. In several states, legislators saw early primaries and caucuses as a way to attract media attention or dollars, and thereby increase their influence within the nominations process (Balz 1993; Berke 1993; Sack 1994) . In Louisiana and Arlizona, Gramm and Buchanan supporters saw earlier events as a way to provide momentum for their candidate. Interviews with several Sunbelt state legislators also pointed to a widespread resentment with the media's traditional focus on Iowa and New Hampshire as minimiz ing the growing importance of Southern Republicanism.
The 1996 GOP primary and caucus calendar also helped several candi dates when early primaries or caucuses were held in friendly states. The early and neighboring Iowa caucuses seemed to most observers to give Bob Dole an assist. So did the complex New York primary rules which (as of this writing), discouraged most rivals, except Pat Buchanan and Steve Forbes.14 Dole also benefitted from the over-representation of Northern and Midwestern states holding delegate-selection events during the first month of the nominations race.15
For conservatives Phil Gramm and Pat Buchanan, the rescheduled Louisiana caucuses seemed likely to provide a boost. Before newcomer Steve Forbe's rise in the polls, the early primaries in Arizona and Delaware were also seen as benefitting Gramm. By comparison, ex-candidates Pete Wilson and Arlen Specter had no such "schedule luck," and neither did Richard Lugar.
The campaign calendar for 1996 also shows a lesser importance for the Super Tuesday primary. In 1992 9 states held a GOP Super Tuesday event. By 1996 seven GOP state events (with roughly 18 percent of all GOP dele gates) were scheduled for Super Tuesday will be picked in the 1996 Super Tuesday primaries.
As Hadley and Stanley (1996) have written, Super Tuesday 1988 failed to match its Democrat Party backers' hopes for greater Southern influence in either the Democrat nominations race.16 Super Tuesday 1992 did, how ever, have an impact in clinching the 1992 nomination for Clinton. By 1996, the Super Tuesday GOP primaries had attracted far less media attention than in earlier years.
Whether the smaller number of 1996 Super Tuesday GOP primaries will have a great effect on the 1996 nominations race is unclear, and per haps doubtful. Thirty-one percent of GOP convention delegates will already have been chosen by Super Tuesday-with more state events in non-southern 5 The Democratic Party's delegate-allocation formula is based on population; the num ber o f Democratic National committee members. Democrats in Congress. Democrat governors, and top party leaders per state. In the Democrat race, the formula provides for 3 .521 pledged delegates, plus another 773 unpledged or "super"-delegates. Both numbers may be subject to change because o f interim elections, deaths, resignations, or party switches by elected officials. At this writing, the total num ber o f GOP delegates was 1.988 and for the Democrats 4.294. *The Delaware primary date was not approved by the Democratic National Com m ittee's Rules and Bylaws Committee. The Delaware Democrat party was threatened with a loss o f 25 percent o f their delegates, as well as other potential (but unspecified) sanctions, if they proceeded with their February 24th primary date. 
